

ER 11-8943

7 NOV 1959

Senator Richard B. Russell  
United States Senate  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Russell:

We have received several inquiries concerning the letter being circulated by Mr. Kenneth Hahn of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles. Inasmuch as you have undoubtedly received inquiries concerning the subject in addition to the letter from Mr. Hahn, I am taking the liberty of writing you about this matter.

Khrushchev's comments about intelligence activities and the Central Intelligence Agency, in our mind, represent part of a deliberate campaign to discredit U. S. intelligence and thus leave a clearer field for Communist subversion. If there is a thaw in the Cold War, Khrushchev obviously would like to deprive the United States of one of its principal weapons for combating Communism. You have noted, of course, that in all of his talk about desiring peace, Khrushchev has stated that Moscow has not renounced and will not change its objective that all of the nations of the free world should and shall become Communist.

As far as Khrushchev's specific claims are concerned, I would point out first that one of his motives was to draw out any information that any official reply or action might supply. You recognize, of course, that from time to time agents are exposed and apprehended. This often happens to Soviet agents. These agents sometimes carry both money and ciphers known as one-time pads. These pads are useful solely for communications between that agent and his home base, and do not affect any other communication system. As far as we are concerned, Khrushchev has not got much comfort out of us in this respect; in fact, nothing comparable to what we have gained from Soviet defectors and agents.

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As far as the general communications systems of the U. S. Government are concerned, they are protected between sender and recipient by a variety of means, none of which were made suspect by Khrushchev's remarks. We are constantly calculating the protection given to such communications by the inherent security of the devices used and are constantly alert to interpret and exploit any information which would alter our calculations. Khrushchev's remarks were limited to matters which did not give us any new information of this sort.

In general, we would say that for the United States to react to Khrushchev's remarks as certain quarters have suggested would be to play into the hands of the Soviets.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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8 NOV 1959  
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